important than the violation of privacy. 8 They argue that the use of the telephone is not a guarantee of privacy, as it carries messages over outlets peculiarly susceptible to wiretapping, the risk of interception is assumed. 9 Since the police only tap the wires of suspects, the danger to the privacy of innocent persons is more imagined than real. Moreover, eavesdropping, 10 the use of disguises by an officer posing as a member of a criminal gang," and the concealment of a microphone in a room, 12 all clear violations of the right of privacy, are permitted. There is no substantial distinction between wiretapping and these other invasions of privacy. Why then prohibit only the one device ?
Comparison of these views indicates that, in the final analysis, the issue is the relative value of privacy and investigative efficiency. The conflict of values may be seen in the private remedies available, the rules concerning the admissibility of such evidence, and the proposed Congressional solution to the problem.
Prtivate Remedies
In situations where wiretapping is thought to be undesirable, there are private tort remedies available.'
3 In some jurisdictions actual damage to property must be shown as in an action for trespass. This is hard to prove, however, for wiretapping ordinarily does not result in property damage.
14 Punitive damages are also available, but they are usually based on malice which would be difficult to show in the case of an officer' 5 . Even if substantial damages for humiliation and mental anguish were ascertained,'
8 they would be difficult to recover against a municipality which is usually not liable in tort without its consent, when acting under the police power.'
7 Where the offender is not an officer, full recovery is allowed subject to the actual and punitive damage rules of each jurisdiction.
If an individual knows that his wires are being tapped, he may seek to have such practices enjoined in the future. Since the success of wiretapping is dependent on secrecy, however, this opportunity will seldom occur. The problem of injunctive relief from wiretapping only arises where law enforcement officials are permitted to engage in this practice, the key to the availability of this rem*edy being "reasonable cause."' 8 Unless such cause can be shown, equity will enjoin continued tapping by officials. Where such cause is shown, however, equity will prefer to await the outcome by saying that the remedy at law, damages for the invasion of privacy, is adequate. In the jurisdictions favoring strict enforcement of the criminal law, therefore, it is to be expected that injunctive relief would be extremely difficult to obtain.
Admissibility as Evidence
Although private remedies seek to protect the right of privacy and furnish some deterrent force to indiscriminate tapping, the most crucial question is raised when information so gained is offered in evidence. Under the common law rule of admissibility, the judge will not delay the trial to determine the collateral issue of its legality.' 9 of exclusion to this kind of evidence.
In Olmstead v. United States, 2 ' an attempt was made to declare wiretapping a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a divided Court, said that wiretapping was neither a "search nor seizure" and since there was no trespass or taking of papers and effects, evidence obtained by the "sense of hearing only" would not be prohibited.
2 2 The history of the Fourth Amendment shows that it was intended to protect the right of privacy, and telephone messages would seem as deserving of protection as letters or papers. The Court, however, preferred to construe the amendment strictly, leaving further determination of the question of legality to Congress.
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In 1934 Congress enacted, as Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, a provision which prohibited the interception of "any communication" and divulgence of messages to any party not entitled thereto unless authorized by the sender. 24 Under that section, the Supreme Court, in Nardone v. United States, 25 rejected evidence exposing a smuggling ring because it was secured by wiretapping, an unauthorized interception. Although the legislative history of this section indicates that its primary purpose was to amend Section 27 of the Radio Act, extending the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission to wire messages, 26 the Court was willing to recognize a possible subsidiary intention to discourage wiretapping which it alleged was "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." A further objection to the application of Section 605 to wiretapping was the contention that it only prohibited tapping on interstate communications. In Sabalowsky v. United States, 2 8 violators of the tax law on spirits were apprehended by federal agents who had secured evidence objection to their admissibility, if they are pertinent to the issue. The court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue, to determine that question. The court replied that while the first and third clauses refer to "interstate or foreign communications" they are intended to include only telegraph companies and their employees; the second and fourth clauses, being unrestricted, prohibit all intercepted communications. This is logical because of the practical impossibility of separating the two types when an agent is listening in on an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
When the Nardone case reached the Supreme Court a second time, Justice Frankfurter extended the statute to exclude any derivative use of "wiretapped evidence." 8 0 The application of the federal rule 31 of exclusion in this case was necessary to prevent a circumvention of the statutory policy.
The broad rule declaring that evidence obtained by violation of Section 605 is inadmissible has been subject to certain limitations since the decisions in the two Nardone cases. The prohibition of the section is not absolute in itself, but is a personal privilege available only to the sender.
In Goldstein v. 'United States, 32 federal agents tapped the wires of certain persons suspected of defrauding insurance companies by fake claims for disability benefits. The information obtained did not come from tapping the wires of the accused; instead it was secured by taps on the wires of his confederates. The agents, informing certain members of the conspiracy of this evidence, persuaded them to turn Government's witnesses by a promise of immunity from prosecution. The accused invoked Section 605 which was held inapplicable since he was not a party to the wire tapped communications. This is a departure from the prohibitive policy of the previous cases and shows that the Court may not be unwilling to adopt a construction of the section that will admit "wiretapped evidence."
Since the section confers a personal privilege on the sender, it may be waived by his consent. By this means, in United States v. Polalcoff, 33 a further inroad on the rule of the Nardone cases was attempted. A conspirator who was involved in a smuggling ring reported its activities to federal agents. Under a carefully devised plan, he telephoned his coconspirators from the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation whose agents recorded the conversation. Counsel for the goyernment alleged that the "sender" authorized divulgened of the message. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that in a telephone conversation each party is alternately sender and receiver and it would be impossible to 30 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). "The burden, is of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established . . . the trial judge must give" opportunity, hoivever closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin."
31 See note 20 supra. 32 316 U.S. 114 (1942) . [Vol. 40
9CIMINAL LAW COMMENTS dissect a conversation so that one party could consent without destroying the other's privilege. Thus the waiver exception to the Nardone case, though recognized, is limited to mutual consent, thereby depriving it of any practical *effect. Even with its limitations, the statute is a remedy against a practice considered to be "unethical" but the question is whether it applies to state courts. In those states which follow the common law rule of admissibility of evidence, 34 the attempt to apply the statute to them under the force of the Fourteenth Anendment has been a failure. Even though the Fourth Amendment has now been read into the Fourteenth, 5 wiretapping cannot be called an "unreasonable search and seizure" because the Olmstead case is still good law.
36
It may be argued that the second clause of Section 605 providing that "no person... shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish ... to any person... 37 prohibits wire tapped evidence in state courts in the same manner in which it is forbidden in federal courts. 88 Failure to so construe the section would practically nullify-its protection of privacy'since the bulk of criminal prosecutions occur in state courts and many criminal offenses, usually prosecuted in federal courts, could, by technical changes in the indictments, be prosecuted in state courts. 8 9 This argument is opposed by the states, who claim that Congress cannot constitutionally impose restrictions on their procedure, and that they have traditionally been free to make their own rules of evidence, providing the accused is given a fair and impartial trial. 40 Congress, however, has the power to prohibit such evidence in the state courts by means of the commerce clause on the ground that, in order to protect interstate commerce, the part of intrastate commerce relating thereto can be regulated. 41 27 (1949) . Justice Frankfurter replied, " the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the states through the Due Process clause."
36 See note 22 supra. Olnstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) . The court reasoned that the Federal Rule is the creation of the judiciary and need not be followed by the states even where an unreasonable search and seizure is involved. 41 Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (in a civil action to recover penalties for violation of Safety Appliance Act, the court applied the commerce clause to control intrastate traffic having a direct effect on interstate traffic). The court said, "interstate traffic ... will be promoted in a real or substantial sense by applying the requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the traffic which is intrastate. state court procedure exists in the provision in the Bankruptcy Act that no testimony by the bankrupt shall be used against him in any criminal proceeding, 42 and the use of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution to compel state courts to enforce claims under the Emergency Price Control Act. 43 This question, however, has not yet been determined and as a result there has been a wide variation among the states that follow the statute and those that do not.
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Thus the passage of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act has not solved the problem. The limitations which have been placed around the statute and its uncertain applicability to the states, have left a considerable degree of variation in the judicial and legislative attitudes toward wiretapping. It is still not certain how far courts should go in excluding evidence of crimes nor is there a clear concept of the privacy of the telephone. As a result, legislators, judges, lawyers, and laymen are asking: at what point, if any, does the end begin to justify a "dirty" means?
Legislative Proposals
The answer to this question is reflected in the recently proposed legislation amending Section 605. The bill allows wiretapping in cases concerning national security and defense. 45 Treason, sabotage, espionage, violation of neutrality laws and others are specifically enumerated, and under the comprehensive phrase, "in any other manner," all crimes affecting national security are intended to be included. 46 This limitation of the subject matter of wiretapping eliminates the criticism that tapping has its major use in relatively unimportant cases. 47 Under this statute, only national security is considered to be paramount to the right of privacy.
The right to "tap" is further limited to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Intelligence Division of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
4 8 Since the indiscriminate use of wiretapping is a fertile source of blackmail and sinister business practices, the possession of wiretapping equipment by anyone, with intent to use it or knowing it will be used in violation of the Act, is a felony. 392 (1947) where the court said, "cit repudiated the assumption that federal laws can be considered by the states as though they were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign. Its teaching is that the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people, 'anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'" [Vol. 40
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Even the ordinary officer, intent on enforcing the law, cannot tap, so great is the protection to the right of privacy.
Securing permission to tap is the most uncertain provision in the proposed law. The initial proposal in the House of Representatives recommended that permission to tap be secured from any federal court on a showing of probable cause ;50 the recommendation of April 6th suggests the use of a warrant, adopting the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 51 while the latest proposal requires the duly authorized agents of the various departments to act under rules and regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. 52 The common element of all three proposals is the necessity to show reasonable cause to believe that an injury to national security will occur if permission is not granted. Either proposal is designed to meet this need; the difference being that the latest one eliminates the time consumed in securing a warrant or permit and, provides greater convenience and efficiency in investigation.
CJonclusion
The battle between administrative efficiency and the right of privacy has been renewed in Congress, apparently with a trend away from the wide protection given to the right of privacy by Section 605. Regardless of the merits of the proposed line which would place only the interest in the national security above the interest of the citizen in the secrecy of his telephone conversations, Congressional action in this field seems highly desirable since the courts are apparently willing to 16t the matter rest with the Olmstwd case and thus avoid the, issue of whether or not the Federal legislation can, by implication, control the rules of evidence in state courts. This legislative proposal does have the merit of imposing a uniform rule, attacldng such evidence at its source instead of the point at which it is offered in court.
The principal area of contention at the present time is the mechanism by which wiretapping will be restricted to eases in which the national security is probably involved. The current proposal, that the practice be regulated under rules prescribed by the Attorney General, suggests a concession to administrative efficiency and expediency. The considerations involved here are the need for absolute secrecy as against the safety of a judicial hearing. Whatever the decision on that point, federal officers will be permitted greater latitude than they now have and the indiscriminate use of wiretapping in relatively unimportant situations will be further curtailed. Thus the present legislation represents certain concessions to each side but no final opinion as to the relative value of the policies, advocated. 
